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Abstract
Recently, several authors have criticized time-symmetrized quantum theory orig-
inated by the work of Aharonov et al. (1964). The core of this criticism was the
proof, which appeared in various forms, showing that counterfactual interpreta-
tion of time-symmetrized quantum theory cannot be reconciled with the standard
quantum theory. I argue here that the apparent contradiction appears due to in-
appropriate usage of traditional time asymmetric approach to counterfactuals, and
that the contradiction disappears when the problem is analyzed in terms of time-
symmetric counterfactuals. I analyze various aspects of time-symmetry of quantum
theory and defend the time-symmetrized formalism.
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1. Introduction. I shall discuss a pre- and post-selected quantum system, i.e. mea-
surements performed at the time between two other measurements. The time-symmetric
formalism for the description of such systems was proposed by Aharonov, Bergmann,
and Lebowitz (ABL) (1964) and was developed in recent years. A partial list of refer-
ences includes Aharonov et al. (1985), Aharonov and Vaidman (1990, 1991). Several
authors criticized the time-symmetric approach to quantum theory in general and some
of its particular applications. The most representative example is the work of Sharp and
Shanks (1993). They presented a proof, which was later repeated and used by others,
that the counterfactual interpretation of the ABL probability rule (Eq. 2 below), can-
not be reconciled with the standard quantum theory. I shall claim here that the proof
contains an error since it presuppose time asymmetry in order to reach a contradiction
with time symmetry. The asymmetry was implicitly assumed through the conventional
approach to counterfactual statements. I argue that for analyzing experiments on pre-
and post-selected quantum system one should use time-symmetric counterfactuals and
then no contradiction arises.
The plan of this work is as follows. In Section 2 I shall present a brief review of the time-
symmetrized formalism and in Section 3 a brief review of the concept of counterfactual.
In Section 4 I analyze possible counterfactual interpretations of the ABL rule. Section 5 is
devoted to the analysis of the inconsistency proof of Sharp and Shanks and its variations.
In section 6 I discuss related time asymmetry preconceptions in quantum theory. In
section 7 the time symmetry (and asymmetry) of the process of quantum measurement
is analyzed in order to give a rigorous context to the previous discussion about the time
symmetry of the ABL rule. An application of the time-symmetrized approach which
allows the definition of new concepts (which I call “elements of reality”) is considered in
section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper with a brief summary and some discussion of the
time-symmetrized quantum theory in the framework of the many-worlds interpretation.
2. Time-Symmetrized Formalism. In standard quantum theory a complete descrip-
tion of a system at a given time is given by a quantum state |Ψ〉. It yields the probabilities
for all outcomes ai of a measurement of any variable A according to the equation
Prob(ai) = |〈Ψ|PA=ai|Ψ〉|
2 (1)
where PA=ai is the projection operator on the subspace defined by A = ai. Eq. 1 is
intrinsically asymmetric in time: the state |Ψ〉 is determined by some measurements in
the past and it evolves toward the future. The time evolution between the measurements,
however, is considered time symmetric since it is governed by the Schro¨dinger equation for
which each forward evolving solution has its counterpart (its complex conjugate with some
other well understood simple changes) evolving backward in time. The asymmetry in time
of the standard quantum formalism is manifested in the absence of the quantum state
evolving backward in time from future measurements (relative to the time in question).
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Time-symmetrized quantum theory describes a system at a given time by a two-
state vector 〈Ψ2||Ψ1〉. It yields the (conditional) probabilities for all outcomes ai of
a measurement of any variable A according to the generalization of the ABL formula
(Aharonov and Vaidman, 1991):
Prob(ai) =
|〈Ψ2|PA=ai|Ψ1〉|
2
∑
j |〈Ψ2|PA=aj |Ψ1〉|
2
. (2)
The time symmetry does not mean that a system described by the two-state vector
〈Ψ2||Ψ1〉 is identical, in regard to its physical properties, to a system described by the two-
state vector 〈Ψ1||Ψ2〉.
1 The time symmetry means that 〈Ψ2| and |Ψ1〉 enter the equations,
and thus govern the observable results, on equal footings. For example, (almost) stan-
dard measurement procedure with weakened coupling (which we call weak measurement,
Aharonov and Vaidman 1990) yields weak values defined as
Aw ≡
〈Ψ2|A|Ψ1〉
〈Ψ2|Ψ1〉
. (3)
When we interchange 〈Ψ2| and |Ψ1〉 the weak value changes to its complex conjugate and
this can be observed in certain experiments. In Eq. 2 and in Eq. 3 the two states enter
on the same footing and the legitimacy of the application of these equations (especially
of Eq. 2) is what I defend in this paper.
In order to explain how to obtain a quantum system described at a given time t by a
two-state vector 〈Ψ2||Ψ1〉 we shall assume for simplicity that the free Hamiltonian of the
system is zero. In this case it is enough to prepare the system at time t1 prior to time
t in the state |Ψ1〉, to ensure no disturbance between t1 and t as well as between t and
t2, and to find the system at t2 in the state |Ψ2〉. It is crucial that t1 < t < t2, but the
relation between these times and “now” is not fixed. The times t1, t, t2 might all be in
the past, or we can discuss future measurements and then they are all in the future; we
just have to agree to discard all cases when the measurements at time t2 does not yield
the outcome corresponding to the state |Ψ2〉.
Note the asymmetry between the measurement at t1 and the measurement at t2.
Given an ensemble of quantum systems, it is always possible to prepare all of them in
a particular state |Ψ1〉, but we cannot ensure finding the system in a particular state
|Ψ2〉. Indeed, if the pre-selection measurement yielded a result different from projection
on |Ψ1〉 we can always change the state to |Ψ1〉, but if the measurement at t2 did not
show |Ψ2〉, our only choice is to discard such a system from the ensemble. Note also the
asymmetry of the measurement procedures. The measurement device has to be prepared
before the measurement interaction in the “ready” state and we cannot ensure finding
the “ready” state after the interaction. We might use some intermediate system which
interacts with the observed system such that this intermediate system has the essential
1Note, however, that if we limit ourselves to “physical properties” which are results of standard ideal
measurements (whose probabilities are governed by Eq. 2), this symmetry property holds too.
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symmetry of the states before and after the interaction. But then the problem will move to
the next level of the measurement procedure chain, and it always reaches the asymmetry,
because, according to the definition of measurement, the observer does not know the result
before the interaction but he does, after the measurement. These asymmetries, however,
are not relevant to the problem we consider here. We study the symmetry relative to
the measurements at time t for a given pre- and post-selected system, and we do not
investigate the time-symmetry of obtaining such a system. The only important detail is
that the measurement coupling at time t has to be time-symmetric, as is assumed in ideal
quantum measurements. See more discussion below, in section 7.
3.Counterfactuals. There are many philosophical discussions on the concept of coun-
terfactuals and especially on the time’s arrow in counterfactuals. Probably, the theory of
counterfactuals of Lewis (1973) receives the most attention. Based on his theory Lewis
(1986) discusses the asymmetry of counterfactuals between past and future. He analyses
mainly deterministic worlds and claims that indeterminism, in particular the indetermin-
ism of the process of reduction of a quantum state in the process of quantum measurement,
does not lead to an asymmetry:
If there is a process of reduction of the wave packet in which a given
superposition may be followed by any of many eigenstates, equally this is a
process in which a given eigenstate may have been preceded by any of many
superpositions. Again we have no asymmetry. (1986, 39)
I disagree with this argument. The superposition which precedes the measurement is
uniquely defined by the classical records regarding measurements in the past. In any way,
the number of possible superpositions is not comparable with the number of eigenstates,
so no symmetry can be seen here.
Apart from the possible connection between indeterminism and an apparent time
asymmetry of our world, the importance of the indeterminism of the standard quantum
theory is that it opens room for counterfactual questions about results of measurements
without involving “miracles”, i.e. events in which physical laws breaks down. Although
Lewis devotes a large part of his theory to considering these “miracles” which are irrelevant
for our discussion, I do adopt the basic approach of his analyses of counterfactuals, i.e.
the usage of the language of “possible worlds”. It is not clear if this is the only way to
go, but I find it fruitful and certainly legitimate.
Another important work on the subject was done by Bennett (1984). He reaches
the conclusion (with which I tend to agree) that Lewis failed to derive the temporal
asymmetry of counterfactuals from general principles. Bennett develops his “Unified
Symmetric Theory” of counterfactuals. It is based on the concept of “T -closest P -world”
which is the world “closest” (whatever it means) to the actual world at time T at which
the proposition P is true.
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There are many discussions of counterfactuals in quantum theory, mostly in the context
of EPR-Bell type experiments. Some of the examples are Skyrms (1982), Peres (1993),
Mermin (1989) (which, however, does not use the word counterfactual), and Bedford and
Stapp (1995) who even present an analysis of a Bell-type argument in the formal language
of the Lewis theory of counterfactuals. The common situation is that a composite system
is described at a certain time by some entangled state and then an array of incompatible
measurements on this system at a later time is considered. Various conclusions are derived
from statements about the results of these measurements. Since these measurements are
incompatible they cannot be all performed together, so it must be that at least some of
them were not actually performed. This is why they are called counterfactual statements.
Note that there is no requirement that none of them are performed, although it might
be so. The actual world is specified by its state at the initial time so it fits the general
framework of Bennett’s theory of counterfactuals.
In the situations discussed in this work the actual world is specified by its state at two
times. Thus, Bennett’s basic concept of T -closest P -world cannot be applied directly, but
the following quotation of Bennett seems very relevant:
Here is an easier example. At T1 I bet that when the coin is tossed at T2
it will come up heads; and in the upshot it does just that; but this is a purely
chance event, with no causally sufficient prior conditions. Now consider the
conditional “If I had bet on tails at T1 I would have lost.” Everyone I have
polled is inclined to say that that conditional is true, despite the fact that
at some of the T1-closest “I bet on tails” worlds the coin comes up heads
[tails?2] at T2. (Why does it come up heads [tails] at some of those worlds?
Because, since the fall of the coin had no causally sufficient prior conditions,
every “tails” [“heads”] world is indistinguishable, in respect of its state at T1,
from some “heads” [“tails”] world.) If I am to respect these judgments I must
modify my theory,... (1984, 76)
In his modification of the theory (which he only sketches in a few lines) there is no formal
symmetry between the times T1 and T2. But this is not because Bennett introduces
temporal asymmetry here, but because the two times have different status. The time
T1 has a special status as the one at which various possibilities (the type of bet to be
taken) have to be chosen, and this is why Bennett relates the concept of T -closest worlds
to T1 and not to T2. In order to analyze temporal symmetry we have to consider a
symmetric setup. Let us add another coin tossing at time T0 prior to the time of the
bet. Unquestionably, “everyone Bennett has polled” who suggested we accept that in all
relevant (counterfactual) worlds the outcome of the coin tossing at time T2 must coincide
with that in the actual world would also suggest that the outcome of the coin tossing
at time T0 must coincide with that in the actual world. Thus, we can see that even a
2It seems to me that there is some mismatch between “tails” and “heads” which I, hopefully, corrected
in the brackets.
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modified theory of counterfactuals of Bennett, which is suitable for the analysis of possible
measurements performed between two other measurements, is symmetrical with regard
to the past and the future of time T1.
The example of Bennett is not identical to the problem of measurement performed
on quantum system at the time between two other measurements. In Bennett’s case
there was no physical mechanism according to which the decision of which bet to make
could influence the result of the coin toss.3 In contrast, most intermediate quantum
measurements change the probabilities for the results of the later measurement. However,
it seems to me that the theory of counterfactuals which respects the actual event at time
T2 in spite of the fact that it should be identical with a specific (actual) result only in 50%
cases is much more close to the theory of counterfactuals accepting an actual event at
time T2 when the probability is different and even influenced by the intermediate action,
rather than to the theory which disregards the actual result at time T2, as is suggested in
alternative interpretations.
4. Counterfactual Interpretations of the ABL Probability Rule. In this section
I shall consider three ways to interpret the “counterfactual interpretation”. The first
interpretation I cannot comprehend, but I have to discuss it since it was proposed and
used in the criticism on the time-symmetrized quantum theory. I believe that I understand
the meaning of the second interpretation, but I shall argue that it is not appropriate for
the problem which is discussed here. The last interpretation is the one I want to adopt
and I shall present several arguments in its favor.
Interpretation (a) Counterfactual probability as the probability of the result of a
measurement which has not been performed.
Let me quote Sharp and Shanks:
...for, conditionalizing upon specified results of measurements of MI and
MF , there is no reason to assign the same values to the following probabilities:
the probability that an intervening measurement ofM had the result mj given
that such a measurement in fact took place, and the probability that interven-
ing measurement would have had the result mj given that no such intervening
measurement of M in fact took place. In other worlds there is no reason to
identify Prob(M = mj |EM [ψ
i
I , ψ
k
F ]) and Prob(M = m
j |E[ψiI , ψ
k
F ]).(1993, 491)
I can not comprehend the meaning of the probability for the result M = mj given that
the measurement M has not take place. As far as I can see Prob(M = mj |E[ψiI , ψ
k
F ]) has
no physical meaning. Sharp and Shanks continue:
(For a classical illustration, consider a drug which, if injected to facilitate
a medical test at t, has an effect, starting shortly after the test and persisting
3Moreover, one can make an experiment which will show that the bet decision does not change the
probability of the result of the coin toss.
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past tF , on the the value of the tested variable. Suppose that it is unknown
whether a test was conducted at t, but that a value for the tested variable is
obtained at tF . Using the value at tF , we would estimate differently the value
prior to t depending on whether we assume that a test did or did not take
place at t.)
This might explain what they have in mind, but the argument does not hold since in many
situations there is no quantum mechanical counterpart to the classical case of “the value
[of a tested variable] prior to t” . In standard quantum theory unperformed experiments
have no results, see Peres (1978).
Cohen and Hiley partially acknowledge the problem admitting that at least in the
framework of the orthodox interpretation this is meaningless concept:
In other words we cannot necessarily assume that the ABL rule will yield
the correct probabilities for what the results of the intermediate measurements
would have been, if they had been carried out, in cases where these measure-
ments have not actually been carried out. In fact, this sort of counterfactual
retrodiction has no meaning in the orthodox (i.e., Bohrian) interpretation of
quantum mechanics, although it can legitimately be discussed within the stan-
dard interpretation [von Neumann (1955)] and within some other interpreta-
tions of quantum mechanics (see, for example, Bohm and Hiley[1993]).(1996,
3)
I fail to understand the interpretation (a) in any framework. Maybe, if we restrict ourselves
to the cases in which the system at the intermediate time is in an eigenstate of the variable
which we intended to measure, (but we had not), we can associate the probability 1 with
such unperformed measurements. This is close to the idea of Cohen (1995) to consider
counterfactuals in the restricted cases corresponding to consistent histories introduced
by Griffith (1984). But, as far as I can see, interesting situations do not correspond
to consistent histories, and therefore no novel (relative to classical theory) features of
quantum theory can be seen in this way. It is possible that what Cohen and Hiley (1996)
have in mind is the interpretation (b) which I shall discuss next.
Interpretation (b)
Counterfactual probability as the probability of the result of a measurement would it
have been performed based on the information about the world in which the measurement
has not been performed.
At time t1 we preselect the state |Ψ1〉. We do not perform any measurement at time
t. We perform a measurement at time t2 and find the state |Ψ2〉. We ask, what would be
the probability for the results of a measurement performed at time t in a world which is
identical to the actual world at time t1.
This is a meaningful concept, but I believe that it is not adequate for discussing
pre- and post-selected quantum systems because it is explicitly asymmetric in time. The
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counterfactual world is identical to the actual world at time t1 and might not be identical
at time t2.
This interpretation of the ABL rule is clearly inconsistent with predictions of quantum
theory. According to the orthodox or standard interpretation the information about the
actual world at time t2 is irrelevant since the state |Ψ1〉 together with the requirement
of no disturbance between t1 and t define completely the probabilities of all possible
measurements at time t. Therefore, the ABL formula for probabilities which includes
explicitly dependence on the result of the measurement at time t2 cannot be consistent
with quantum theory.
One may speculate about possible modifications of quantum theory which reconstruct
statistical predictions of standard quantum theory but include, in addition, some hidden
variables which specify individual outcomes of seemingly random results of quantum mea-
surements. Then the information about the results of the measurements at time t2 in a run
of the experiment without an intermediate measurement might add to the description of
the actual world at time t1. See, for example, the discussion about such a situation in the
framework of the Bohm (1952) theory by Aharonov and Albert (1987). In the framework
of a hidden variable theory, for estimating the probabilities of the result of measurements
at time t we have to consider the sub-ensemble of the pre-selected systems at time t1 which
have hidden variables corresponding to the appropriate result of the measurement at time
t2 on the condition that no disturbance (and, in particular no measurement at time t)
took place between t1 and t2. The question of consistency between the ABL rule and
the predictions of quantum theory in such framework seems to be a nontrivial problem.
One may just recall the difficulty in the framework of the Bohm (1952) hidden variable
theory according to which the outcome of a spin measurement might depend not only
on the hidden variable of the system, but also on the state of the measuring device, (see
Albert 1992, 153-154). However, I shall present now a simple example which allows us to
show the inconsistency between quantum theory and this interpretation of the ABL rule
irrespectively of the details of the hidden-variable theory.
Consider a spin-1/2 particle pre-selected at time t1 in the state | ↑z〉 and post-selected
at the time t2 in the same state | ↑z〉. We ask what is the probability for finding spin “up”
in the direction ξˆ which makes an angle θ with the direction zˆ, at the intermediate time
t. In this case, the hidden variables, even if they exist, cannot change that probability
because any particle pre-selected in the state | ↑z〉, irrespectively of its hidden variable,
yields the outcome “up” in the post-selection measurement at time t2. Therefore, the
statistical predictions about the intermediate measurement at time t must be the same
as for the pre-selected only ensemble (these are identical ensembles in this case), i.e.
Prob(↑ξ) = |〈↑ξ | ↑z〉|
2 = cos2(θ/2). (4)
The ABL formula, however, yields:
Prob(↑ξ) =
|〈↑z |P↑ξ | ↑z〉|
2
|〈↑z |P↑ξ | ↑z〉|
2 + |〈↑z |P↓ξ | ↑z〉|
2
=
cos4(θ/2)
cos4(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2)
(5)
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We have obtain two different results. This shows that this interpretation of the ABL rule
is incorrect.
Interpretation (c) Counterfactual probability as the probability for the results of a
measurement if it has been performed in the world “closest” to the actual world.
This is identical in form and spirit to the theory of counterfactuals of Bennett (1984),
although the context of the pre- and post-selected quantum measurements is somewhat
beyond what he considered. This interpretation is explicitly time-symmetric. The title,
however, does not specify it completely and I shall explain what do I mean (in particular
by the word “closest”) now.
I have to specify the concept of “world”. There are many parts of the world which
do not interact with the quantum system in question, so their states are irrelevant to the
result of the measurement. In our discussion we might include all these irrelevant parts,
or might not, without changing any of the conclusions. There are other aspects of the
world which are certainly relevant to the measurement at time t, but we postulate that
they should be disregarded. Everything which is connected to our decision to perform
the measurement at time t and all the records of the result of that measurement are not
considered. Clearly, the counterfactual world in which a certain measurement has been
performed is different from an actual world in which, let us assume, no measurement
has been performed at time t. The profound differences are both in the future where
certain records exist or do not exist and in the past which must be different since one
history leads to performing the measurement at time t and another history leads to no
measurement.4 However, our decision to make the measurement is not connected to the
quantum theory which makes predictions about the result of that measurement. We want
to limit ourselves to the discussion of the time-symmetry of the quantum theory. We do
not consider here the question of the time-symmetry of the entire world. Therefore, we
exclude the external parts from our consideration.
What constitutes a description of a quantum system itself is also a very controversial
subject. The reality of the Schro¨dinger wave, the existence or inexistence of hidden vari-
ables etc. are subjects of hot discussions. However, everybody agrees that the collection
of all results of measurements is a consistent (although maybe not complete) description
of the quantum system. Thus, I propose the following definition:
A world “closest” to the actual world is the world in which all measure-
ments (except the measurement at the time t if performed) have the same
outcomes as in the actual world.
This definition overcomes the common objection according to which one should not con-
sider together statements about pre- and post-selected systems regarding different mea-
surements at time t because these systems belong to different ensembles. The difference
4If a random process chooses between the two possibilities, then the past before this process might be
identical.
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is in their quantum state at the time period between t and t2.
5 Formally, the problem
is solved by considering only results of measurements and not the quantum state. The
justification of this step follows from the rules of the game: it is postulated that the quan-
tum system is not disturbed during the periods of time (t1, t) and (t, t2). Therefore, it is
postulated that no measurement on the system is performed during these periods of time.
Since unperformed measurements have no results, the difference between the ensembles
has no physical meaning in the discussed problem.
From the alternatives I presented here, only interpretation (c) is time-symmetric. This
is the reason why I believe that it is the only reasonable candidate for analyzing the (time-
symmetric) problem of measurements performed between two other measurements.
A very serious study of time’s arrow and counterfactuals, in particular, in the frame-
work of quantum theory, was performed recently by Price (1996). Let me quote from his
section “Counterfactuals: What should we fix?”:
Hold fixed the past, and the same difficulties arise all over again. Hold
fixed merely what is accessible, on the other hand, and it will be difficult to
see why this course was not chosen from the beginning. (1996, 179)
This quotation looks very much like my proposal. And indeed, I find many arguments
in his book pointing in the same direction. However, this quotation represents a time
asymmetry: “merely what is accessible” is, in fact, “an accessible past”. But this is
not the time asymmetry of the physical theory; Price writes: “no physical asymmetry is
required to explain it.” Although the books includes an extensive analysis of a photon
passing through two polarizers – the classic setup for the ABL case, I found no explicit
discussion of a possible measurement in between, the problem we discuss here.6
5. Inconsistency proofs. The key point of the criticism of the time-symmetrized
quantum theory is the conflict between counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule and
predictions of quantum theory. I shall argue here that the proofs of the inconsistency are
unfounded and therefore the criticism essentially falls apart.
The inconsistency proofs (Sharp and Shanks 1993; Cohen 1995; Miller 1996) have
the same structure. Three consecutive measurements are considered. The first is the
preparation of the state |Ψ1〉 at time t1. The probabilities for the results ai of the second
5If one is adopting our backward evolving quantum state, he can add that the systems are also different
due to the backward evolving state between t and t1.
6Price briefly and critically mentions the ABL paper. He writes (1996, 208): “What they [ABL] fail
to note, however, is that their argument does nothing to address the problem for those who disagree with
Einstein – those who think that the state function is a complete description, so that the change that takes
place on measurements is a real change in the world, rather than merely change in our knowledge of the
world.” This seems to me an unfair criticism: the ABL clearly state that in the situations they consider
“the complete description” is given by two wave functions, see more in Aharonov and Vaidman (1991).
Moreover, it seems to me that the development of this time-symmetric quantum formalism is not too far
from the spirit of the “advanced action” – the Price vision of the solution of the time’s arrow problem.
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measurement at time t are considered. And the final measurement at time t2 is intro-
duced in order to allow the analysis which uses the ABL formula. Sharp and Shanks
consider three consecutive spin component measurements of a spin-1/2 particle in differ-
ent directions. Cohen analyses a particular single-particle interference experiment. It is
a variation on the theme of Mach-Zehnder interferometer with two detectors for the final
measurement and the possibility of placement of a third detector for the intermediate mea-
surement. Finally, Miller repeated the argument for a system of tandem Mach-Zehnder
interferometers. In all cases the “pre-selection only” situation is considered.
It is unnatural to apply the time symmetrized formalism for such cases. However, it
must be possible. Thus, I should not show that the time-symmetrized formalism has an
advantage over the standard formalism for describing these situations; I should only show
consistency. In the standard approach to quantum theory the probability for the result
of the measurement of A at time t is given by Eq. 1. The claim of all the proofs is that
the counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule yields a different result. In all cases
the final measurement at time t2 has two possible outcomes which we signify as “1f” and
“2f”; they are spin “up” or “down” and the click of the detector D1 or D2 respectively.
The suggested application of the ABL rule is as follows. The probability for the result ai
is:
Prob(A = ai) = Prob(1f)Prob(A = ai|1f) + Prob(2f)Prob(A = ai|2f), (6)
where Prob(A = ai|1f) and Prob(A = ai|2f) are the conditional probabilities given by the
ABL formula, Eq. 2, and Prob(1f ) and Prob(2f) are the probabilities for the results of
the final measurement. There is no ambiguity about the probability of the intermediate
measurement given the result of the final measurement, it is uniquely defined by the ABL
formula. The error in the proofs is in the calculation of the probabilities Prob(1f) and
Prob(2f) of the final measurement. In all three cases it was calculated on the assumption
that no measurement took place at time t. Clearly, one cannot make this assumption here
since then the discussion about the probability of the result of the measurement at time
t is meaningless. Unperformed measurements have no results. Thus, there is no surprise
that the value for the probability Prob(A = ai) obtained in this way comes out different
from the value predicted by the quantum theory.
Straightforward calculations show that if one uses the formula (6) with the probabilities
Prob(1f) and Prob(2f) calculated on the condition that the intermediate measurement has
been performed, then the outcome is the same as predicted by the standard formalism of
quantum theory. Consider, for example, the experiment suggested by Sharp and Shanks,
the consecutive spin measurements with the three directions in the same plane and the
relative angles θab and θbc. The probability for the final result “up” is
Prob(1f) = cos
2(θab/2) cos
2(θbc/2) + sin
2(θab/2) sin
2(θbc/2), (7)
and the probability for the final result “down” is
Prob(2f) = cos
2(θab/2) sin
2(θbc/2) + sin
2(θab/2) cos
2(θbc/2). (8)
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The ABL formula yields
Prob(up|1f) =
cos2(θab/2) cos
2(θbc/2)
cos2(θab/2) cos2(θbc/2) + sin
2(θab/2) sin
2(θbc/2)
(9)
and
Prob(up|2f) =
cos2(θab/2) sin
2(θbc/2)
cos2(θab/2) sin
2(θbc/2) + sin
2(θab/2) cos2(θbc/2)
. (10)
Substituting all these equations into Eq. 6 we obtain
Prob(up) = cos2(θab/2). (11)
This result coincide with the prediction of the standard quantum theory. It is a straight-
forward exercise to show in the same way that no inconsistency arises also in the examples
of Cohen and Miller.
Apparently, the motivation of the authors of the above inconsistency proofs for taking
the expressions for the probabilities Prob(1f) and Prob(2f) based on the assumption
that no measurement has been performed at time t follows from their interpretation of
“counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule” which was named (a) above. It seems
that they consider that a necessary condition for a counterfactual is that it has to be
contrary to what is in the actual world. In their view the only alternative to the postulate
of “no measurement” is the postulate that a measurement has been actually performed.7
I believe, however, that one can interpret counterfactuals without postulating that they
are necessarily contrary to the actual world, see interpretation (c) above. Moreover, as I
explained above, I find their interpretation (a) physically meaningless.
6. Time asymmetry prejudice. In my approach the pre- and post-selected states
are given. Only intermediate measurements are to be discussed. So the frequently posed
question about the probability of the result of the post-selection measurement is irrelevant.
It seems to me that the critics of the time-symmetrized quantum theory use in their
arguments the preconception of an asymmetry. It is not surprising then that they reach
various contradictions. Probably the first to go according to this line were Bub and
Brown:
Put simply, systems initially in the state ψI which are subject to an N
measurement, and subsequently yield the state ψF after an MF measurement,
would not necessarily yield this final state if subjected to a measurement of
M instead of N . (1986, 2338)
Their argument is valid (see Albert et al. 1986) in the context of the possible hidden
variable theories which allow us to predict the results of measurements, but it should not
7In this case the authors of the inconsistency proofs say that no contradiction arises, but also no
interesting question can be asked.
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be brought against proposals of a time-symmetrized formalism as it was done frequently
later. Let me quote a few examples: Cohen writes:
We have no reason to expect that, for example, theN/4 systems preselected
by |ψ1(t1)〉 and post-selected by |ψ2(t2)〉 after an intermediate measurement of
σ1y would still have yielded the state |ψ2〉 after an intermediate measurement
of σ2x or of σ1yσ2x instead of σ1y.(1995, 4375)
A consistent time-symmetric approach should question the pre-selection on the same
footing as the post-selection; or rather not question any of them, as I propose.
Another asymmetry pre-conception lead to the “retrodiction paradox” of Peres:
The asymmetry between prediction and retrodiction is related to the fact
that predictions can be verified (or falsified) by actual experiments, retrodic-
tions cannot. Retrodictions are counterfactual statements about unperformed
experiments; in quantum mechanics, unperformed experiments have no results
(Peres 1987). (1994, 23)
While I certainly agree that unperformed experiments have no results, I challenge the
interpretation according to which counterfactual statements are necessarily about events
which do not happen. The asymmetry considered by Peres (1994) is, in fact, between
prediction based on the results in the past of time t in question and inference based on
the results both in the past and in the future of time t. This inference he erroneously
considered as retrodiction (see Aharonov and Vaidman 1995).
If we are not considering a pre- and post-selected system then there is an asymmetry
between prediction and retrodiction. For example (Aharonov and Vaidman 1990, 11-12),
assume that the x component of the spin of a spin-1/2 particle was measured at time
t, and was found to be σx = 1. While there is a symmetry regarding prediction and
retrodiction for the result of measuring σx after or before time t (in both cases we are
certain that σx = 1), there is an asymmetry regarding the results of measuring σy. We can
predict equal probabilities for each outcome, σy = ±1, of a measurement performed after
time t, but we cannot claim the same for the result of a measurement of σy performed
before time t. The difference arises from the usual assumption that there is no “boundary
condition” in the future, but there is a boundary condition in the past: the state in
which the particle was prepared before time t. Maybe in a somewhat artificial way we
can reconstruct the symmetry even here, out of the context of pre- and post-selected
systems. We can “erase” the results of the measurements of the spin measurements in
the past (Vaidman 1987, 61). In order to do this we perform at time t0, before time t,
a measurement of a Bell-type operator on our particle and another auxiliary particle, an
ancilla. We ensure that no measurement is performed on the particle between t0 and t
(except the possible measurement whose result we want to consider) and we prevent any
measurement on the ancilla from time t0 and on. The Bell-type measurement correlates
the quantum state of our particle evolving from the past with the results of the future
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measurement performed on the ancilla. Since the latter is unknown, we obtain, effectively,
an unknown past for our particle. Now, for such a system, if we know that the result of
the measurement at time is σx = 1, we can also retrodict that there are equal probabilities
for both outcomes of the measurement of σy performed before time t (but after time t0).
The time symmetry is restored.8
7. Time symmetry of the process of measurement. Obviously, in order to discuss
a measurement at time t between two other measurements in a time-symmetric way, the
process of measurement at time t must be time-symmetric. Usually, a measurement of a
quantum variable A is modeled by the von Neumann (1955) Hamiltonian
H = g(t)pA, (12)
where p is the momentum conjugate to the pointer variable q, and the normalized coupling
function g(t) specifies the time of the measurement interaction. The function g(t) can be
made symmetric in time (not that it matters) and the form of the coupling then is time-
symmetric. The result of the measurement is the difference between the value of q before
and after the measurement interaction. So it seems that everything is time-symmetric.
However, usually there is an asymmetry in that that the initial position of the pointer
is customized to be zero (and therefore the final position correspond to the measured value
of A). This seemingly minor aspect points to a genuine asymmetry. Of course, the initial
zero position of the pointer is not a necessary condition; we can choose any other initial
position as well. But, we cannot chose the final position. We know the initial position and
we find out, at the end of the measurement the final position. We can introduce another
step with symmetrical coupling, but we will not be able to remove the basic asymmetry:
we do not know the result of the measurement before the measurement but we do know
it after the measurement.
This asymmetry in time is an intrinsic property of the concept of measurement and
it has no connection to the quantum theory. It is related to the arrow of time based
on the increasing memory. See illuminating discussion of Bitbol (1988) of the process of
measurement in the framework of the many-worlds interpretation (Everett, 57).
The symmetry aspect of the process of measurement which is important for our dis-
cussion is that a measurement at time t leads to identical forward and backward evolving
states out of time t. Operationally, it means that under the assumption of zero Hamil-
tonian and and identical pre- and post-selected states (or mixtures), the probabilities for
the result of any measurement performed before t (but after the pre-selection) is equal
to that performed after time t (but before the post-selection). The measurement de-
scribed by the Hamiltonian (12) has this time symmetry. Moreover, any “ideal” von
Neumann measurement, which projects on the property to be measured and does not
8The time symmetry is restored not just for the σy measurement, but for any spin measurement.
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change the quantum state if it has the measured property, is symmetric in this sense. Re-
cently Shimony (1995) proposed considering more general quantum measurements which
do not change the measured property (so they are repeatable, the main property which
is required from a “good” measurement) but which change the state (even if it has the
measured property). Such measurements are intrinsically asymmetric in our sense, since
given identical boundary conditions in the past and in the future they lead to different
probabilities for the results of some measurements performed before or after the time of
the generalized measurement. Clearly, the time symmetrized formalism is not applicable
for such measurements as Shimony has showed.
8. Elements of Reality. Until now we have discussed a situation in which we know
the results of the measurements at t1 and t2, we know that there is no measurement
or disturbance of the system between t1 and t2 except, may be, a measurement at time
t. We also discussed the outcomes of that possible measurement. For the same system
we can discuss several, in general incompatible, possible measurements at time t and
this is why we consider it as counterfactual reasoning. Interesting novel (relative to a
pre-selection only situation) structures emerge in this situation. In particular, there are
situations in which several incompatible measurement (if performed) have certain results
with probability 1. I have proposed to call them elements of reality (Vaidman 1993a,
1996). These elements of reality, contrary to the pre-selected situations might contradict
the product rule (Vaidman 1993b), i.e., if A = a and B = b are elements of reality,
AB = ab might not be an element of reality.
One important aspect of these elements of reality is that they are Lorentz invariant.
Their introduction solves an apparent contradiction which follows from the existence of
Lorentz invariant elements of reality. Let me quote a recent paper by Cohen and Hiley:
A further criticism by Vaidman (1993) leads to the conclusion that the
gedanken experiment [of Hardy, 1992] does not lead to any contradiction,
because it involves a pre- and post-selected quantum system, for which, it is
claimed, the “product rule” does not apply. Unfortunately, as we show in a
separate paper [apparently Cohen and Hiley 1996], Vaidman’s analysis is not
valid because it makes incorrect use of the formula of Aharonov, Bergman and
Lebowitz (1964; Aharonov and Vaidman 1991).(1995, 76)
I believe that I have succeeded here in showing the legitimacy of applying the ABL
formula for pre- and post-selected quantum systems with a choice of possible intermediate
measurements which is exactly the situation considered in Hardy’s gedanken experiment
and thus defending my results (1993).
One might argue about the significance of these concepts beyond the philosophical
construction of (jointly unmeasurable) “elements of reality”, since it is impossible to per-
form incompatible measurements on a single system. I find the most important aspect of
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these concepts in their relation to weak measurements (Aharonov and Vaidman 1990).9
Weak measurements are almost standard measurement procedures with weakened cou-
pling. Weak measurements essentially do not change the quantum states (evolving forward
and backwards in time) of the system. Several weak measurements can be performed on
a single system and they are compatible even though their counterparts, the ideal mea-
surements are not compatible.
An example of an interesting connections between weak and strong (ideal) measure-
ments is the theorem (Aharonov and Vaidman 1991) which says that if the probability
for a certain value to be the result of a strong measurement is 1, then the corresponding
weak measurement must yield the same value.10 However, in general, the outcome of
weak measurements might not be one of the possible outcomes of a strong measurement.
The outcome of the weak measurement of a variable A is the weak value (Eq. 3) which
might lie far away from the range of the eigenvalues of A. The weak value is not just a
theoretical concept related to a gedanken experiment. Recently, weak values have been
measured in a real laboratory (Ritchie et al., 1991).
9. Conclusions. In this paper I have defended the time-symmetrized quantum for-
malism originated by Aharonov et al. (1964) against recent criticism. The criticism
followed from the pre-conception of time asymmetry which is the feature of the standard
formalism of quantum theory and of the standard approach to counterfactual reasoning.
I have argued, that in the context of the experiments on pre- and post-selected quantum
systems, the time-symmetric counterfactual theory suggested by Bennett (1984) is the
most appropriate. I introduced the time-symmetric counterfactual interpretation of the
ABL rule and showed that it does not lead to any contradiction with the predictions of
quantum theory.
I disagree in an essential way with a large number of recent works. In particular, con-
trary to the conclusions of Sharp and Shanks (1993), I believe that the time-symmetrized
quantum theory “yields fresh insights about the fundamental interpretive issues in quan-
tum mechanics”. I base my belief on the research in which I took part and which allowed
us to see numerous surprising quantum effects which are hidden in the framework of the
standard approach in very complicated mathematics of some peculiar interference effects
(e.g. Aharonov et al. 1987, 1990, 1993; Vaidman 1991). I see a novel rich structure in
time-symmetrized quantum theory which suggests and solves surprising quantum prob-
lems (Vaidman et al. 1987; Vaidman 1996). It is also plausible that the time-symmetrized
9The scope of this paper allows only to touch this broad issue, but one can find more on this subject
in Vaidman (1996) where, in particular, I defined a new type of reality based on the concept of weak
measurements.
10In such situation, when we discuss the outcomes of weak measurements, the statements about strong
measurement have even a stronger counterfactual sense. The counterfactual reasoning about unperformed
strong measurements (which correspond to elements of reality) helps us to find out the results of the
performed weak measurements.
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approach might help investigated the current problems of quantum gravity (see, for ex-
ample, Unruh 1995).
The time-symmetrized quantum theory fits well into the many-worlds interpretation
(MWI), my preferred interpretation of quantum theory (Vaidman 1993c, 1994). The
counterfactual worlds corresponding to different outcomes of quantum measurements have
in the MWI an especially clear meaning: these are subjectively actual different worlds.
In each world the observers of the quantum measurement call their world as actual, but,
if they believe in the MWI they have no paradoxes about ontology of the other worlds.
Consider an illuminating example (this time of pre-selected only situation) by Mermin
(1989) in which counterfactual reasoning lead him to wonder: can he help his favorite
baseball team to win by watching their game on television? Or, can an action in one
region change something in a space-time separated region? The counterfactual reasoning
in the framework of the standard (single-world) interpretations lead him to the paradoxical
answer “yes”. The MWI answers that his action in one place causes different separation
into worlds which include correlations between the two regions and therefore we have,
this time a not surprising answer “yes”. If we consider the problem from an external
position, i.e. we consider the whole physical universe which incorporates all the worlds,
then we obtain the expected answer “no”.11 Some things at the remote location become
correlated to different things at the first location, but it does not change any measurable
property in the remote location.
The MWI interpretation yields also a convincing answer to paradoxical situations
considered by Penrose:
What is particularly curious about quantum theory is that there can be actual
physical effects arising from what philosophers refer to as counterfactuals –
that is, things that might have happened, although they did not happened.
(1994, 240)
According to the MWI, in the situations considered by Penrose, “things” did not hap-
pened in a particular world, but did happened in some other world (see Vaidman 1994).
Therefore, they did took place in the physical universe and thus their effect on some other
facts in the physical universe is not so surprising.
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11The answer “no” is expected because of the locality of physical interactions.
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